In the picture below, Shane Vereen (#34) starts as the outside most Wide Receiver and motions in to the backfield. A Raiders Linebacker (#50) chases him all the way across the formation; this is a tell-tale sign of Man-to-Man coverage. This is highlighted by the squares in the freeze frame.

If the defense did not reveal Man Coverage, Tom Brady would likely audible the play or focus on his zone coverage read, which is the right side of the field (Edelman and Amendola) in this picture. Once Vereen sets in the backfield, here is Vereen and Gronkowski’s (#87) mesh combination. Oakland is playing Man-to-Man on all other Receivers, with Charles Woodson as the Free Safety in Cover 1.

We already know the Linebacker that has followed Vereen’s motion will be covering him in Man-to-Man, which leaves Rob Gronkowski. No Raider Defensive Back is lined up directly on Gronkowski, but there is one on his outside shoulder. This leaves one Raider Linebacker unaccounted for (#50). His assignment is to “bracket” or double-cover Rob Gronkowski. More specifically, he is supposed to “wall-off” any inside breaking route by Gronkowski and help the outside shade Defensive Back. These defensive assignments are seen below:

However, as the play unfolds, Gronkowski is able to beat the Bracket Coverage Linebacker across his face. This happens for multiple reasons:

First, Gronkowski is able to have a completely free release off the line. Defensive End Justin Tuck has the opportunity to hit Gronkowski off the line, but Gronk quickly dips inside and avoids any contact, getting a clean release. Second, the Mesh concept creates traffic between Vereen, Gronkowski, and the 3 Oakland defenders. This traffic is exactly the purpose of the Mesh Concept and is difficult to cover. Finally, Gronkowski is a special talent: There are only a handful of Tight Ends that can get off the line clean and have the speed to beat a Defensive Back across the field while avoiding a Linebacker.

The result of the Motion & Mesh Concept is seen below first in slow motion, and then standard speed:

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The Post-Wheel combo involves the outside Wide Receiver running around 10 yards and breaking 45 degrees toward the goal post. The inside, or slot Wide Receiver will break as if he is running an out route, then turn up the field looking for a big play.

On defense, Seattle is playing Cover 1 Robber. Seattle defensive backs are all matched up man-to-man, except Earl Thomas (the robber) and Cam Chancellor (playing deep middle). Another indicator of man coverage is that Denver’s running back (Montee Ball) is lined up on the bottom of the screen closest to the sideline, and Seattle’s Linebacker Bobby Wagner follows him. Richard Sherman then moves inside to line up with Wide Receiver Wes Welker.

Here is a still shot of what Peyton Manning sees pre-snap and what will unfold schematically:

Below is Denver’s first play of the drive, an incomplete pass. Seattle should have taken note, however, because Emmanuel Sanders was wide open after beating his man-to-man coverage. Here’s how it unfolds:

Seattle adjusts by switching to their patent Cover 3 Buzz, a true and full zone scheme. Here is what Cover 3 Buzz is supposed to look like (from last year’s Super Bowl):

Courtesy of Bleacher Report (Matt Bowen)

The second time Denver runs Post-Wheel, it’s against Cover 3 Buzz. Just as the first still picture shows, Earl Thomas will still be the Robber and Cam Chancellor will still have the deep middle of the field. However, the Cornerback at the top of the screen, Byron Maxwell, is responsible for the top deep 1/3 of the field. The Post-Wheel combo puts Maxwell in a predicament because Seattle plays extremely aggressive Cover 3 by “Pattern Matching”, or having the freedom to follow certain vertical routes.

Should Maxwell continue with Demaryius Thomas’ Post route, or stay in his 1/3 of the field and Cover Emmanuel Sanders’ wheel route and pass off the post route to Cam Chancellor? If Maxwell chooses to follow Demaryius Thomas on the Post, then the linebacker must “carry” Emmanuel Sanders’ wheel route and cover him up the sideline.

Below, the blue lines represent Denver’s routes, and the red represents Seattle’s choices defensively:

If the neither happens, see the result:

In the NFL, making a mistake is not a cardinal sin. However, there is nothing that aggravates coaches more than being a “mistake repeater.” On the 26 yard touchdown, Denver runs a Post-Wheel for the THIRD time in a 1-minute span (from a different formation), with Seattle in Cover 3 Buzz again. However, inexplicably, Seattle has not learned from the earlier plays in this drive. Here is the Touchdown in standard speed, with another Post-Wheel:

On the touchdown, Seattle has 3 ways to avoid this touchdown: the Cornerback could sink and stay “on top” of the wheel route, Earl Thomas as the robber could turn his hips and follow the wheel route, or the linebacker could carry and cover the wheel route. While the linebacker reacts faster this time, it is still far too late. It appears as if he is trying to protect the sideline and keep everything in bounds to keep the clock moving. But, because they’ve seen Post-Wheel twice on this drive already, the linebacker should have been more aware. (Earl Thomas attempts to rob the post route).

Note*: None of the Post-Wheel combinations targeted Richard Sherman, who likely would have played them differently.

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